#### Excessive consumption makes extinction inevitable- social and environmental factors build positive feedbacks create a cascade of destruction. **Our alternative is to reject the politics of technological production-** only social reorganization away from consumption can save the planet

Ehrenfeld ‘5,

(David, Dept. of Ecology, Evolution, and Natural Resources @ Rutgers University, “The Environmental Limits to Globalization”, *Conservation Biology* Vol. 19 No. 2 April 2005)

The known effects of globalization on the environment are numerous and highly significant. Many others are undoubtedly unknown. Given these circumstances, the first question that suggests itself is: Will globalization, as we see it now, remain a permanent state of affairs (Rees 2002; Ehrenfeld 2003a)? The principal environmental side effects of globalization—climate change, resource exhaustion (particularly cheap energy), damage to agroecosystems, and the spread of exotic species, including pathogens (plant, animal, and human)—are sufficient to make this economic system unstable and short-lived. The socioeconomic consequences of globalization are likely to do the same. In my book *The Arrogance of Humanism* (1981), I claimed that our ability to manage global systems, which depends on our being able to predict the results of the things we do, or even to understand the systems we have created, has been greatly exaggerated. Much of our alleged control is science fiction; it doesn’t work because of theoretical limits that we ignore at our peril. We live in a dream world in which reality testing is something we must never, never do, lest we awake. In 1984 Charles Perrow explored the reasons why we have trouble predicting what so many of our own created systems will do, and why they surprise us so unpleasantly while we think we are managing them. In his book *Normal Accidents*, which does not concern globalization, he listed the critical characteristics of some of today’s complex systems. They are highly interlinked, so a change in one part can affect many others, even those that seem quite distant. Results of some processes feed back on themselves in unexpected ways. The controls of the system often interact with each other unpredictably. We have only indirect ways of finding out what is happening inside the system. And we have an incomplete understanding of some of the system’s processes. His example of such a system is a nuclear power plant, and this, he explained, is why system-wide accidents in nuclear plants cannot be predicted or eliminated by system design. I would argue that globalization is a similar system, also subject to catastrophic accidents, many of them environmental—events that we cannot define until after they have occurred, and perhaps not even then. The comparatively few commentators who have predicted the collapse of globalization have generally given social reasons to support their arguments. These deserve some consideration here, if only because the environmental and social consequences of globalization interact so strongly with each other. In 1998, the British political economist John Gray, giving scant attention to environmental factors, nevertheless came to the conclusion that globalization is unstable and will be short-lived. He said, “There is nothing in today’s global market that buffers it against the social strains arising from highly uneven economic development within and between the world’s diverse societies.” The result, Gray states, is that “The combination of [an] unceasing stream of new technologies, unfettered market competition and weak or fractured social institutions” has weakened both sovereign states and multinational corporations in their ability to control important events. Note that Gray claims that not only nations but also multinational corporations, which are widely touted as controlling the world, are being weakened by globalization. This idea may come as a surprise, considering the growth of multinationals in the past few decades, but I believe it is true. Neither governments nor giant corporations are even remotely capable of controlling the environmental or social forces released by globalization, without first controlling globalization itself. Two of the social critics of globalization with the most dire predictions about its doom are themselves masters of the process. The late Sir James Goldsmith, billionaire financier, wrote in 1994, It must surely be a mistake to adopt an economic policy which makes you rich if you eliminate your national workforce and transfer production abroad, and which bankrupts you if you continue to employ your own people.... It is the poor in the rich countries who will subsidize the rich in the poor countries. This will have a serious impact on the social cohesion of nations. Another free-trade billionaire, George Soros, said much the same thing in 1995: “The collapse of the global marketplace would be a traumatic event with unimaginable consequences. Yet I find it easier to imagine than the continuation of the present regime.” How much more powerful these statements are if we factor in the environment! As globalization collapses, what will happen to people, biodiversity, and ecosystems? With respect to people, the gift of prophecy is not required to answer this question. What will happen depends on where you are and how you live. Many citizens of the Third World are still comparatively self-sufficient; an unknown number of these will survive the breakdown of globalization and its attendant chaos. In the developed world, there are also people with resources of self-sufficiency and a growing understanding of the nature of our social and environmental problems, which may help them bridge the years of crisis. Some species are adaptable; some are not. For the non- human residents of Earth, not all news will be bad. Who would have predicted that wild turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo), one of the wiliest and most evasive of woodland birds, extinct in New Jersey 50 years ago, would now be found in every county of this the most densely populated state, and even, occasionally, in adjacent Manhattan? Who would have predicted that black bears (Ursus americanus), also virtually extinct in the state in the mid-twentieth century, would now number in the thousands (Ehrenfeld 2001)? Of course these recoveries are unusual—rare bright spots in a darker landscape. Finally, a few ecological systems may survive in a comparatively undamaged state; most will be stressed to the breaking point, directly or indirectly, by many environmental and social factors interacting unpredictably. Lady Luck, as always, will have much to say. In his book *The Collapse of Complex Societies,* the archaeologist Joseph Tainter (1988) notes that collapse, which has happened to all past empires, inevitably results in human systems of lower complexity and less specialization, less centralized control, lower economic activity, less information flow, lower population levels, less trade, and less redistribution of resources. All of these changes are inimical to globalization. This less-complex, less-globalized condition is probably what human societies will be like when the dust settles. I do not think, however, that we can make such specific predictions about the ultimate state of the environment after globalization, because we have never experienced anything like this exceptionally rapid, global environmental damage before. History and science have little to tell us in this situation. The end of the current economic system and the transition to a postglobalized state is and will be accompanied by a desperate last raid on resources and a chaotic flurry of environmental destruction whose results cannot possibly be told in advance. All one can say is that the surviving species, ecosystems, and resources will be greatly impoverished compared with what we have now, and our descendants will not thank us for having adopted, however briefly, an economic system that consumed their inheritance and damaged their planet so wantonly. Environment is a true bottom line—concern for its condition must trump all purely economic growth strategies if both the developed and developing nations are to survive and prosper. Awareness of the environmental limits that globalized industrial society denies or ignores should not, however, bring us to an extreme position of environmental determinism. Those whose preoccupations with modern civilization’s very real social problems cause them to reject or minimize the environmental constraints discussed here ( Hollander 2003) are guilty of seeing only half the picture. Environmental scientists sometimes fall into the same error. It is tempting to see the salvation of civilization and environment solely in terms of technological improvements in efficiency of energy extraction and use, control of pollution, conservation of water, and regulation of environmentally harmful activities. But such needed developments will not be sufficient—or may not even occur— without corresponding social change, including an end to human population growth and the glorification of consumption, along with the elimination of economic mechanisms that increase the gap between rich and poor. The environmental and social problems inherent in globalization are completely interrelated—any attempt to treat them as separate entities is unlikely to succeed in easing the transition to a postglobalized world. Integrated change that combines environmental awareness, technological innovation, and an altered world view is the only answer to the life-threatening problems exacerbated by globalization (Ehrenfeld 2003b). If such integrated change occurs in time, it will likely happen partly by our own design and partly as an unplanned response to the constraints imposed by social unrest, disease, and the economics of scarcity. With respect to the planned component of change, we are facing, as eloquently described by Rees (2002), “the ultimate challenge to human intelligence and self-awareness, those vital qualities we humans claim as uniquely our own. *Homo sapiens* will either. . .become fully human or wink out ignominiously, a guttering candle in a violent storm of our own making.” If change does not come quickly, our global civilization will join Tainter’s (1988) list as the latest and most dramatic example of collapsed complex societies. Is there anything that could slow globalization quickly, before it collapses disastrously of its own environmental and social weight? It is still not too late to curtail the use of energy, reinvigorate local and regional communities while restoring a culture of concern for each other, reduce nonessential global trade and especially global finance (Daly & Cobb 1989), do more to control introductions of exotic species (including pathogens), and accelerate the growth of sustainable agriculture. Many of the needed technologies are already in place. It is true that some of the damage to our environment—species extinctions, loss of crop and domestic animal varieties, many exotic species introductions, and some climatic change— will be beyond repair. Nevertheless, the opportunity to help our society move past globalization in an orderly way, while there is time, is worth our most creative and passionate efforts. The citizens of the United States and other nations have to understand that our global economic system has placed both our environment and our society in peril, a peril as great as that posed by any war of the twentieth century. This understanding, and the actions that follow, must come not only from enlightened leadership, but also from grassroots consciousness raising. It is still possible to reclaim the planet from a self-destructive economic system that is bringing us all down together, and this can be a task that bridges the divide between conservatives and liberals. The crisis is here, now. What we have to do has become obvious. Globalization can be scaled back to manageable proportions only in the context of an altered world view that rejects materialism even as it restores a sense of communal obligation. In this way, alone, can we achieve real homeland security, not just in the United States, but also in other nations, whose fates have become so thoroughly entwined with ours within the global environment we share.

#### Wind power massively increases consumption while erasing the question “consumption of what” – abstract reveling in consumption re-produces unequal neoliberal social relations and risks environmental crises

Byrne & Toly 6

(Josh, director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy and distinguished professor of energy and climate policy at the University of Delaware, Noah, Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Politics & International Relations, Director of Urban Studies Program at Wheaton, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse”, pgs. 1-32 in Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict, eds. Josh Byrne, Noah Toly, and Leigh Glover)

What are the characteristics of this success? One envied feature is the remarkable decline in the price of wind-generated electricity, from $0.46 per kWh in 1980 to $0.03 to $0.07 per kWh today (Sawin, 2004), very close to conventionally-fueled utility generating costs in many countries, even before environmental impacts are included. Jubilant over wind’s winning market performance, advocates of sustainable energy foresee a new era that is ecologically much greener and, yet, in which electricity remains (comparatively) cheap. Lester Brown (2003: 159) notes that wind satisfies seemingly equally weighted criteria of environmental benefit, social gain, and economic efficiency: Wind is...clean. Wind energy does not produce sulfur dioxide emissions or nitrous oxides to cause acid rain. Nor are there any emissions of health-threatening mercury that come from coal-fired power plants. No mountains are leveled, no streams are polluted, and there are no deaths from black lung disease. Wind does not disrupt the earth’s climate...[I]t is inexhaustible...[and] cheap. This would certainly satisfy the canon of economic rationalism. It is also consistent with the ideology of modern consumerism. Its politics bestow sovereignty on consumers not unlike the formula of Pareto optimality, a situation in which additional consumption of a good or service is warranted until it cannot improve the circumstance of one person (or group) without decreasing the welfare of another person (or group).17 How would one know “better off” from “worse off” in the wind-rich sustainable energy era? Interestingly, proponents seem to apply a logic that leaves valuation of “better” and “worse” devoid of explicit content. In a manner reminiscent of modern economic thinking, cheap-and-green enthusiasts appear willing to set wind to the task of making “whatever”—whether that is the manufacture of low-cost teeth whitening toothpaste or lower cost SUVs. In economic accounting, all of these applications potentially make some in society “better off” (if one accepts that economic growth and higher incomes are signs of improvement). Possible detrimental side effects or externalities (an economic term for potential harm) could be rehabilitated by the possession of more purchasing power, which could enable society to invent environmentally friendly toothpaste and make affordable, energy-efficient SUVs. Sustainable energy in this construct cooperates in the abstraction of consumption and production. Consumption- of-what, -by-whom, and -for-what-purpose, and, relatedly, production-of-what, -by-whom, and -for-what-purpose are not issues. The construct altogether ignores the possibility that “more-is-better” consumption- production relations may actually reinforce middle class ideology and capitalist political economy, as well as contribute to environmental crises such as climate change. In the celebration of its coming market victory, the cheap-and-green wind version of sustainable energy development may not readily distinguish the economic/class underpinnings of its victory from those of the conventional energy regime.

Our alternative is to reject the politics of technological production

Rather than focusing on production of technology, we should embrace our ability to shape and transform our subjectivity as consumers, embracing voluntary simplicity – this debate offers a crucial moment to produce alternative knowledge about everyday living practices

Alexander ‘11

(Samuel, University of Melbourne; Office for Environmental Programs/Simplicity Institute, “

Voluntary Simplicity as an Aesthetics of Existence”, Social Sciences Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1941087)

The aim of this paper, however, is not to present a thorough analysis of Foucault’s notion of an aesthetics of existence. Several such analyses have appeared in recent times (after years of unfortunate scholarly neglect), and much of this emerging commentary is very probing and insightful.12 But this is not the time to focus on furthering that critical discussion or even providing a comprehensive literature review of it. Instead, after providing a brief exposition of Foucault’s ethics, this paper will undertake to actually apply the idea of an aesthetics of existence to a particular subject of ethical concern, namely, to our role as ‘consumers’ in the context of First World overconsumption. This is an area that raises ethical questions concerning how we ought to live for two main reasons: firstly, due to the impact Western--‐style consumers are having on the natural environment; and secondly, due to the continued existence of poverty amidst plenty. There is, however, another perspective to consider also. A large body of sociological and psychological literature now exists indicating that Western--‐style consumption practices are often failing to provide meaning and fulfillment, even to those who have ‘succeeded’ in attaining a high material standard of living.13 These three consumption--‐related issues – ecological degradation, poverty amidst plenty, and consumer malaise – provide ample grounds for thinking that consumption is a proper subject for ethical engagement, in the Foucauldian sense of ethics as ‘the self enfgaging the self.’ If it is the case that our individual identities have been shaped, insidiously perhaps, by a social system that celebrates and encourages consumption without apparent limit – and it would not be unfair to describe consumer societies in these terms14 – then it may be that ethical practice today calls for a rethinking of our assumptions and attitudes concerning consumption, which might involve a deliberate reshaping of the self by the self. This paper will explore the possibility of such an ethics of consumption in the following ways. First, by explaining how neoclassical economics, which is arguably the most influential paradigm of thought in the world today, conceptualizes consumption as something that benefits both ‘self’ and ‘other’ and, therefore, as something that should be maximized. To the extent that modern consumers have internalized this conception of consumption, an ethics of consumption might involve engaging the self for the purpose of changing the self and creating something new. The second way an ethics of consumption will be explored will be through an examination of the theory and practice of ‘voluntary simplicity,’ a term that refers to an oppositional living strategy or ‘way of life’ with which people, somewhat paradoxically, perhaps, seek an increased quality of life through a reduction and restraint of one’s level of consumption.15 The paradox, so-­‐ called, consists in the attempt to live ‘more with less.’ Since voluntarily living simply means heading in the opposite direction to where most people in consumer societies (and increasingly elsewhere) seem to want to go, one would expect living simply to require a fundamentally creative engagement with life and culture, especially in contemporary consumer societies that seem to be predicated on the assumption that ‘more consumption is always better.’ This need for a fundamentally creative engagement with life is what prompted the present attempt to elucidate the idea of ‘voluntary simplicity as aesthetics of existence,’ and it is this attempt to infuse Foucauldian ethics with an emerging post-­‐consumerist philosophy of life that constitutes the original contribution of this paper. It is hoped that this practical application of Foucault’s ethics might also prompt others to consider how ethical engagement might produce new ways of being that are freer, more fulfilling, and yet less resource-­‐intensive and damaging than the modes of being which are dominant in consumer societies today. Could it be, for example, that the ‘Death of Man,’ to use Foucault’s phrase, was actually the first (and a necessary) phase in the demise of what one might call ‘homo consumicus’? And what forms of life, what modes of being, would or could materialize with the voluntary emergence of ‘homo post-­‐consumicus’? These are the large questions that motivated this study and in the following pages a preliminary attempt is made to grapple with them. The aim, however, is not to legitimate ‘what is already known,’16 since that would not be a very Foucauldian endeavor; rather, the aim is to explore whether or to what extent it is possible to ‘free thought from what it silently thinks,’17 in the hope that this might open up space to ‘think differently,’18 to think otherwise.

#### The aff’s calls for pragmatism and specificity are a farce – their change in energy strategy represents conscious adoption of larger institutional logics, not an incremental change in existing policy – only radical analysis of the energy system takes the aff’s change seriously and avoids error replication

Byrne & Toly 6

(Josh, director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy and distinguished professor of energy and climate policy at the University of Delaware, Noah, Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Politics & International Relations, Director of Urban Studies Program at Wheaton, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse”, pgs. 1-32 in Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict, eds. Josh Byrne, Noah Toly, and Leigh Glover)

When measured in social and political-economic terms, the current energy discourse appears impoverished. Many of its leading voices proclaim great things will issue from the adoption of their strategies (conventional or sustainable), yet inquiry into the social and political-economic interests that power promises of greatness by either camp is mostly absent. In reply, some participants may petition for a progressive middle ground, acknowledging that energy regimes are only part of larger institutional formations that organize political and economic power. It is true that the political economy of energy is only a component of systemic power in the modern order, but it hardly follows that pragmatism toward energy policy and politics is the reasonable social response. Advocates of energy strategies associate their contributions with distinct pathways of social development and define the choice of energy strategy as central to the types of future(s) that can unfold. Therefore, acceptance of appeals for pragmatist assessments of energy proposals, that hardly envision incremental consequences, would indulge a form of selfdeception rather than represent a serious discursive position. An extensive social analysis of energy regimes of the type that Mumford (1934; 1966; 1970), Nye (1999), and others have envisioned is overdue. The preceding examinations of the two strategies potentiate conclusions about both the governance ideology and the political economy of modernist energy transitions that, by design, leave modernism undisturbed (except, perhaps, for its environmental performance).

### 2nc Alt 1st Slayer

The alt must come first – renewables fail and only promote more consumption by making energy cheaper per unit – reducing consumption first is a pre-requisite to solving environmental collapse

Alexander 12

(Samuel, co-director of the Simplicity Institute and a lecturer in ‘Consumerism and Sustainability’ at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne, “Can renewable energy sustain consumer societies?”, http://www.energybulletin.net/stories/2012-04-26/can-renewable-energy-sustain-consumer-societies-save-friday)

Most people, including many environmentalists, seem to believe that Western-style consumer lifestyles can be sustained and even globalised, provided the world transitions to systems of renewable energy and produces goods more cleanly and efficiently. This assumption is reflected especially clearly in political discussion on environmental issues, which consistently pushes the message that we can grow our economies while reducing ecological impact. This view relies heavily on the expectation that renewable energy sources can be substituted for fossil fuels, but very little attention is given to the question of whether that expectation is realistic. Environmentalists want to believe it, but of course merely wanting something does not affect the laws of physics. With little recognition, Dr. Ted Trainer has spent the best part of a decade tirelessly surveying the best available data on renewable energy and other technologies, and he has recently published the culmination of his efforts with the Simplicity Institute. Contradicting widely held assumptions, Trainer presents a formidable case that renewable energy and other ‘tech-fixes’ will be unable to sustain growth-based and energy-intensive consumer societies, with implications that are as profound as they will be unwelcome. Trainer’s general point on technology is that the extent of ecological overshoot is already so great that technology alone will never be able to solve the ecological crises of our age, certainly not in a world based on economic growth and with a growing global population. The best-known advocate of technological solutions to ecological problems is probably Amory Lovins, most famous for his ‘factor four’ thesis. He argues that if we exploit technology we could have four times the economic output without increasing environmental impact (or maintain current economic output and reduce environmental impact by a factor of four). In response Trainer points out that if the rich economies grow at 3% until 2070, and by that stage the poorest nations have attained similarly high living standards – which seems to be the aim of the global development agenda – total world economic output and impact could be 60 times larger than it is today. If we assume that sustainability requires that fossil fuel use and other resource consumption must be half of what they are today (and the greenhouse problem would probably require a far larger reduction than this), then what is needed is something like a factor 120 reduction in the per unit impact of GDP, not merely a factor 4 reduction. Even allowing for some uncertainty in these calculations, the claim that technological solutions can solve the ecological crises and sustain limitless economic growth is simply not credible. Trainer has shown that the necessary reductions in ecological impact that are just beyond what is remotely possible. The final nail in the coffin of techno-optimists is the fact that despite decades of extraordinary technological advance, the overall ecological impact of the global economy is still increasing, making even a factor four reduction through technological advance seem wildly optimistic. Trainer has also levelled a narrower critique of technological solutions, which focuses on renewable energy. This is not the place to review in detail Trainer’s arguments and research, which would be a laborious task given the meticulous and necessarily dry nature of his analysis of the evidence. For the facts and fixgures, readers are referred to Trainer’s latest essay. But the critical findings of his technical research can be easily summarised. After examining the evidence on varieties of solar, wind, biomass, hydrogen, etc., as well as energy storage systems, Trainer concludes that the figures just do not support what almost everyone assumes; that is to say, they do not support the argument that renewable energy can sustain consumer societies. This is because the enormous quantities of electricity and oil required by consumer societies today simply cannot be converted to any mixture of renewable energy sources, each of which suffer from various limitations arising out of such things as intermittency of supply, storage problems, resource limitations (e.g. rare metals, land for biomass competing with food production, etc.), and inefficiency issues. Ultimately, however, the cost is the fundamental issue at play here. Trainer provides evidence showing that existing attempts to price the transition to systems of renewable energy are wildly understated. This challenging conclusion, however, only defines the magnitude of the present problem. If we were to commit ourselves to providing nine or ten billion people with the energy resources currently demanded by those in the richest parts of the world, then the problems and costs become greater by orders of magnitude. The challenges are exacerbated further by the existence of the “rebound effect,” a phenomenon that often negates the expected energy use reductions of efficiency improvements. At times efficiency improvements can even be the catalyst for increased energy consumption, a phenomenon known as the “Jevons” paradox. Going directly against the grain of mainstream thinking on these issues, Trainer is led to conclude that renewable energy and efficiency improvements will never be able to sustain growth-based, consumer societies, primarily because it would be quite unaffordable to do so. It is of the utmost importance to emphasise that this is not an argument against renewable energy; nor is it an argument more broadly against the use of appropriate technologies to achieve efficiency improvements. Trainer argues without reservation that the world must transition to full dependence on systems of renewable energy without delay and exploit appropriate technology wherever possible. We cannot afford not to! But given the limitations and expense of renewable energy systems, any transition to a just and sustainable world requires a vastly reduced demand for energy compared to what is common in the developed regions of the world today, and this necessitates giving up growth-based, consumer societies and the energy-intensive lifestyles they support and promote. The implications of this can hardly be exaggerated. It means that the global consumer class must learn how to live ‘simpler lives’ of reduced resource and energy consumption, as well as build new economic systems based on notions of sufficiency rather than excess. But as I have argued elsewhere, this does not need to sound so depressing. A growing number of people are seeing the hollowness of consumer culture and are finding a new abundance in oppositional lifestyles of voluntary simplicity. The necessary cultural shift obviously requires a radical change in worldview, and it is difficult to be optimistic that the necessary changes will ever arrive. But as Lao Tzu once said: ‘Those who know they have enough are rich,’ which also suggests that those who have enough, but who do not know it, are poor.

### AT Human Nature

#### Human nature can be changed – its not set in advance and pedagogical transformation in this debate can change consumer behavior

Schor ‘10

(Julie, Prof. of Economics @ Boston College, Plenitude: The New Economics of True Wealth, pgs. 11-12)

And we don't have to. What's odd about the narrowness of the national economic conversation is that it leaves out theoretical advances in economics and related fields that have begun to change our basic understandings of what motivates and enriches people. The policy conversation hasn't caught up to what's happening at the fore- front of the discipline. One of the hallmarks of the standard economic model, which hails from the nineteenth century, is that people are considered relatively unchanging. Basic preferences, likes and dislikes, are assumed to be stable, and don't adjust as a result of the choices people make or the circumstances in which they find themselves. People alter their behavior in response to changes in prices and incomes, to be sure, and sometimes rapidly. But there are no feedback loops from today's choices to tomorrow's desires. This accords with an old formulation of human nature as fixed, and this view still dominates the policy conversation. However, there's a growing body of research that attests to human adaptability. Newer thinking in behavioral economics, cultural evolution, and social networking that has developed as a result of interdisciplinary work in psychology, biology, and sociology yields a view of humans as far more malleable. It's the economic analogue to recent findings in neuroscience that the brain is more plastic than previously understood, or in biology that human evolution is happening on a time scale more compressed than scientists originally thought. As economic actors, we can change, too. This has profound implications for our ability to shift from one way of living to another, and to be better off in the process. It's an important part of why we can both reduce ecological impact and improve well- being. As we transform our lifestyles, we transform ourselves. Patterns of consuming, earning, or interacting that may seem unrealistic or even negative before starting down this road become feasible and appealing. Moreover, when big changes are on the table, the narrow trade-offs of the past can be superseded. If we can question consumerism, we're no longer forced to make a mandatory choice between well-being and environment. If we can admit that full-time jobs need not require so many hours, it'll be possible to slow down ecological degradation, address unemployment, and make time for family and community. If we can think about knowledge differently, we can expand social wealth far more rapidly. Stepping outside the "there is no alternative to business-as-usual" thinking that has been a straitjacket for years puts creative options into play. And it opens the doors to double and triple dividends: changes that yield benefits on more than one front. Some of the most important economic research in recent years shows that a single intervention-a community reclamation of a brownfield or planting on degraded agriculture land-can solve three problems. It regenerates an ecosystem, provides income for the restorers, and empowers people as civic actors. In dire straits on the economic and ecological fronts, we have little choice but to find a way forward that addresses both. That’s what plenitude offers.

### 2nc AT Grid Failure

#### The alt solves the case – consumer-oriented approaches change consumer behavior and prevent excessive consumption – cause more efficient adaptive strategies

Orcutt 10

(Mike, Writer and Analyst for Popular Mechanics, “How a Smarter Grid Can Prevent Blackouts—and Cut Your Energy Bills”, August 6th, 2010, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/efficiency/how-a-smarter-grid-can-prevent-blackouts)

Better Information for Consumers In general, consumers are left in the dark regarding the disparity between generation prices inside and outside the peak demand window. We usually pay a fixed seasonal rate no matter how much electricity use. But utility company-conducted studies consistently show that when consumers are aware of real-time price fluctuations, and are asked to pay dynamic rates based on the time of day they are using electricity, they scale back their consumption during peak hours. Installing "smart meters" and communications technology necessary to make prices more transparent is a major goal of the federal government, which invested nearly $4 billion smart grid technologies through the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Utility companies across the country are developing strategies for smart meter implementation, and rolling out pilot programs to test pricing models. California is leading the charge, with plans to have over 10 million smart meters operational within the next three years. But implementing smart metering throughout the country will call for a large up-front expenditure. Using the California cost as a proxy, it's been estimated that it could cost up to $40 billion. Better Information for Utilities Besides smart meters, one of the first smart grid components to be deployed is called a phasor management unit (PMU), or synchrophasor. PMUs measure parameters like voltage and current at multiple locations across the grid and use GPS technology to give outputs with high-resolution time stamps. Since the measurements are synchronized, data from multiple PMUs can be combined, providing grid operators with a comprehensive picture of real-time conditions across an entire region. Since PMUs can collect so much data so quickly (about 30 times a second), in the case of unexpected changes in demand, they could help utilities respond more quickly by, say, shedding or shifting electricity load from an overburdened plant. The technology generally used to monitor the grid today refreshes only once every four seconds. "Certain circumstances are happening faster than a four-second scanning rate can measure," says Jeff Dagle, chief electrical engineer for energy technology development at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. PMUs could also provide crucial information to grid workers trying to restore power to specific regions after an outage, and help investigators more clearly understand what went wrong after blackout or brownout, Dagle says. Over the next three years, there will be a dramatic increase in the number of PMUs deployed across the country, spurred by the Recovery Act. Timing Is Everything Consumers can reduce the peak by strategically timing certain processes. Water heating, for example, consumes a significant amount of energy, EPRI's Seal says, but hot water can be stored relatively easily. Heating it outside the peak would take a bite out of demand, easing the stress on the grid, even if under current pricing models it wouldn't shrink the monthly electricity bill. As smart grid initiatives advance, and pricing models change, Seal says, "one might find that heating your water at any other time than the peak is very, very cheap." A similar effect could be realized in well-insulated homes. People could precool or preheat their homes before the peak, "and then back off and coast during those hours." Seal says. Additionally, some utilities have launched initiatives in which customers can opt to allow the utility to turn down their programmable home thermostats during peak hours. Programs like this should become more prevalent as long as utilities are willing to invest in the relevant technologies, and consumers are willing to buy into them.

### AT Perm/Link Turn

Alt must come first – the aff’s increase in energy efficiency produces increases in consumption, only first changing consumption patterns can avoid ecological collapse

Dardozzi 8

(Jeff, co-founder of The Earth Alchemists and is a designer/builder of living structure for the un-plasticized, “The Specter of Jevons' Paradox”, Synthesis/Regeneration 47 (Fall 2008))

In the early eighties, an old debate within economics resurfaced surrounding something called Jevons' Paradox, or the more descriptive term rebound effect. Many well-known minds, such as Amory Lovins, piped in on the new meaning of this old, obscure argument buried in 19th century classical economics. First coined by the economist W. Stanley Jevons in The Coal Question (1865), the paradox he noted was in regards to coal consumption and efficiency improvements in steam engines: "It is a confusion of ideas to suppose that economical use of fuel is equivalent to diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth." In the 1980s, Jevons' observation was revisited by the economists Daniel Khazzoom and Leonard Brookes. In their analysis, they looked beyond the relationship between energy resources and the machines that convert them to useful work to consider the overall effect of technological improvements in resource efficiencies on the energy use of a society as a whole. They argued that increased efficiency paradoxically leads to increased overall energy consumption. In 1992, the economist Harry Saunders dubbed this hypothesis the Khazzoom-Brookes Postulate and showed that it was true under neo-classical growth theory over a wide range of assumptions. Since the appearance of the Khazzoom-Brookes Postulate, numerous studies have weighed in on the debate arguing a range of impacts of the rebound effect. In January 2008, Earthscan released Jevons Paradox: The Myth of Resource Efficiency Improvements as the latest and most comprehensive review of the paradox in economics literature. Prefaced by anthropologist Joseph Tainter (The Collapse of Complex Societies, 1988), the book reviews the history of the debate, current findings and includes the latest multi-disciplinary studies regarding the existence of the rebound effect. The book clearly supports the proposition that the rebound effect is present in the US, Europe and most other economies and that strategies to increase energy efficiency in themselves will do little to improve the energy or the ecological situation. In fact, they may well worsen it as the historical impact of resource efficiency improvements shows that increasing the efficiency in the use of a resource in turn increases the consumption of that resource.

#### Sequencing DA – centering consumption as a subject of ethical concern is a pre-requisite to the aff – their “production-focused” change to energy policy only marginalizes consumption practices by treating them as a given outside of politics

Alexander ‘11

(Samuel, University of Melbourne; Office for Environmental Programs/Simplicity Institute, “

Voluntary Simplicity as an Aesthetics of Existence”, Social Sciences Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1941087)

For present purposes, the third and final point about how neoclassicism marginalizes consumption concerns the way in which any problems caused by market activity are always approached from the ‘production angle,’ never the ‘consumption angle.’70 The reasoning is as follows. Despite the first two ways in which neoclassicists conceptualize consumption as unquestionably good, no one, not even neoclassicists, can deny that market activity is causing, and has always caused, some real problems. Think, for example, of the many ecological crises we are facing today, such as climate change, the mass extinction of species, pollution, deforestation, the depletion of the ocean’s fisheries, soil erosion, etc. One might have thought that these crises would have prompted neoclassicists to finally rethink their uncritical attitudes toward consumption, to finally acknowledge that, perhaps, consumption is not unquestionably good. But this has proven to be a false hope, and perhaps this should have come as no surprise. Neoclassicism, after all, is a grand, totalizing meta‐narrative, which claims to have an answer to all criticisms, such that all and any of the problems caused by market activity have a purported solution within the free market system and without needing to rethink or revise any of the neoclassical assumptions (including the assumptions about consumption). If there is a problem caused by market activity, neoclassicists argue, this simply indicates that there has been what is called a ‘market failure,’ which typically means that the costs of production have somehow been externalized, leading to artificially cheap commodities which, in turn, leads to the overconsumption of such commodities. But the neoclassical solution to such overconsumption does not require questioning consumption in any way. Consumption, as we have seen, is sacrosanct! Rather, the solution to such market failures is simply to attempt to internalize all externalities from the production angle – that is, to try to find ways to make sure that the costs of production reflect the ‘true’ costs (i.e. the costs all things considered). Once this has been achieved – if it can be achieved – any consumption that takes place is once again assumed to be at an ‘optimal’ level, which is to say, at a level that maximizes overall utility. In this way, neoclassicism manages to retain perfect faith in the virtue of consumption. We might conclude, therefore, consciously or unconsciously, that since consumption is a virtue, it need not be a subject of ethical concern. Acts of consumption are beyond ethics, or, as neoclassicists put it, such acts are simply ‘given.’ The point of all this has been to suggest that the paradigm of neoclassical economics may be responsible, and surely is responsible, for why consumption has been marginalized as a subject of ethical concern within market societies and beyond. And given the essentially hegemonic role neoclassical economics plays in the world today – manifesting in the globalized political sphere as ‘neoliberalism’71 or ‘Empire’72 – perhaps it should come as no surprise to discover that all of us may have internalized its precepts to some degree. That is, even those who have never studied or even heard of neoclassical economics – indeed, even those who dedicate considerable amounts of time to criticizing the ideology! – may still have imbibed some of its reasoning simply by virtue of living in a world that is so fundamentally shaped by it. We are, after all, social constructs, and, as explained earlier, our perception of the world and of ourselves is a function of the paradigm of understanding that we bring to experience and that we use to make sense of the world. We do not get to choose which paradigm we think with, however, since the act of choosing would be an act of thinking, and in order to think in the first place a paradigm of understanding already has to be in place. As Martin Heidegger once asserted, somewhat cryptically, ‘language speaks man,’73 by which he meant, we can suppose, that our notions of ‘self’ are not independent of language but a function of it. Donald Davidson made a similar point, but more clearly, when he wrote that ‘there is no chance that someone can take up a vantage point for comparing conceptual schemes by temporarily shedding his own.’74 We must begin, that is, from where we are, with whom we are, rebuilding the boat of understanding one plank at a time, without ever being able to begin again from scratch. If neoclassical economics has been internalized to some extent, consciously or unconsciously – in particular, if one has internalized the neoclassical understanding of consumption as unquestionably good – this means that the first step in any ethics of consumption might involve engaging the self by the self for the purpose of centering consumption; that is, for the purpose of deliberately bringing consumption into focus as a subject of ethical concern. Every conceptual framework conceals as it reveals, and whatever enlightenment one might gain from neoclassical economics, it must be acknowledged that its impressive edifice also casts shadows. Consumption, for reasons just explained, lies in the dark. An ethics of consumption must begin, therefore, by casting light in its direction, and this can only be achieved by deliberately giving the subject increased attention. Obviously, if one does not look for, or cannot see, a subject of ethical concern, it will not be a subject of ethical concern. However, even when the possibility of dedicating increased attention to consumption has been raised, which is perhaps the most difficult step, there is a second step, and that is to actually maintain the attention. The third step is to determine how, exactly, and in what ways, one could engage the self by the self with respect to consumption (an endeavor that is taken up in the next two sections). Notice, here, that the terrain of ethical activity lies within the self, at least at first, rather than being external to it. Someone who is cognizant of the three consumption-­‐ related problems outlined above – ecological degradation, poverty amidst plenty, and consumer malaise – might initially think that living in opposition to those problems must require, say, attending rallies, campaigning for political reform, engaging in civil disobedience, volunteering, engaging with and trying to mobilize the community, etc. These are surely all important things, but if our minds are not in order, then it may be that we end up directing our time and energies to pointless or even counter‐productive activity. One thinks here of the young Alcibiades, who wanted to leap into a political career, but who was ultimately persuaded by Socrates that, before he tried to take care of and assume control over others, he should first make sure he had taken care of and was in control of himself.75 Otherwise, even the best intentions might go astray. Socrates was to reproach Alcibiades for being so presumptuous: ‘you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but while not knowing them you think that you do.’76 Importantly, however, Socrates was not assuming the role of advisor on the basis that he knew more than Alcibiades; rather, in typical fashion, Socrates assumed his role on the basis that he better understood the limits of knowledge; better understood that if he knew anything, it was that he knew not. In other words, Socrates knew better than any other that human understanding always has blind spots. The analysis above was intended to suggest that consumption might be one such blind spot.

#### Cascade Effect DA – initial expansion of consumption cascades into exponentially greater future consumption without corresponding increases in quality of life – only displacing disposable culture from the beginning can stop runaway consumption

Alexander ‘11

(Samuel, University of Melbourne; Office for Environmental Programs/Simplicity Institute, “

Voluntary Simplicity as an Aesthetics of Existence”, Social Sciences Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1941087)

The importance of reading about consumerism, to begin with, lies in the fact that many of the mechanisms of consumer society are not obvious and, for that reason, can escape our notice. But if those mechanisms are not recognized or understood, they obviously cannot be resisted. Consequently, we can find ourselves shaped by those mechanisms in insidious ways. For example, the complex concept ‘hedonic adaptation’108 holds that once human beings have their basic material needs satisfied, further increases in material wealth can have short-­term influences on happiness (the so-­‐called ‘consumer buzz,’ of which we may be all aware), but little or no long-­term influence on happiness (a phenomenon which may be much less obvious). That is, once human beings attain a modest material standard of living, evidence suggests that we end up ‘adapting’ to further increases in material wealth, which means that we typically find ourselves no better off than when they were less wealthy. If this is so, and there is considerable evidential support for this phenomenon,109 then this should affect the way we shape our lives, especially with respect to our pursuit of consumption. We might decide, for example, that if the pursuit of increased material wealth is unlikely to provide long-­‐term satisfaction then that pursuit should not be the focus of our lives. But if we do not know about the process of ‘hedonic adaptation,’ then we cannot plan our lives with the aim of avoiding consumption that is wasteful from the perspective of happiness. A second example of the subtle workings of consumerism – from the many to choose from – is known as the ‘Diderot Effect’ (named after the philosopher Denniss Diderot who was the first to write about the phenomenon).110 The ‘Diderot Effect’ refers to how one consumer purchase can induce the desire for other purchases, which can induce further desires, and so on. The purchase of some new shoes looks out of place without a new outfit to match; a new car looks out of place parked in front of a shabby old house; painting the lounge can make the kitchen look even older; and replacing the sofas tempts one to replace the chairs too. This striving for uniformity in our standards of consumption is known as ‘the Diderot Effect,’ and it can function to lock us onto a consumerist treadmill that has no end and attains no lasting satisfaction. But if we are aware of this phenomenon, we can take steps to resist it, by foregoing the initial upgrading, for example, and thereby step off the consumerist treadmill. We can then do something else with our lives – something more ambitious, perhaps, than making sure our carpet matches our walls. The point of these two examples is to show how consumerism can often lock us into practices of consumption that are wasteful of our time and energy (to say nothing of the waste of resources they entail). By dedicating some of our attention to the study of consumerism, however, we may deepen our insight into the world, and our lives, and this may well assist us in escaping consumerism and in the planning and creation of new, post-­‐consumerist forms of life. By deepening our understanding of consumption and its effects, that is, we may find ourselves better able to live lives of what David Shi called, ‘enlightened material restraint.’111

### AT Efficiency/Perm

#### Rebound Effects DA – increases in efficiency lead to increases in consumption – the aff can’t be a springboard to social transformation since it drives unethical action

Jenkins et al. 2011

one of the country's leading energy and climate policy analysts and advocates, managing the Breakthrough Institute's analytical and policy development programs (February, Jesse, Ted Nordhaus, and Michael Shellenberger, “ENERGY EMERGENCE REBOUND & BACKFIRE AS EMERGENT PHENOMENA” <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/Energy_Emergence.pdf>)

This paper surveys a variety of mechanisms that, following a below-cost improvement in energy efficiency, drive a rebound in energy consumption at both micro- and macroeconomic scales (Section 2). As this survey indicates, these rebound mechanisms are real and are not insignificant. Moreover, they combine to drive a total economy-wide rebound effect that undermines the ability of below-cost energy efficiency measures to reduce total energy consumption or related greenhouse gas emissions. While evidence of the scale of economy-wide rebound is not conclusive, several methods of inquiry offer key insights into the likely impact of rebound effects (Section 3). Inquiries focused on microscale behavioral responses to efficiency improvements have yielded robust estimates of direct rebound effects in specific contexts, primarily end-use efficiency savings in developed economies (Section 3.1.1). These inquiries find that in such contexts, the direct rebound effect alone can erode 10-30% of projected technical energy savings before any other indirect and macroeconomic rebound mechanisms are accounted for. Direct rebound effects are likely to be greater in developing economies and also appear to be more significant in the productive sectors of the economy (e.g., industry and commerce), where direct rebounds may range from 20-60% or higher, particularly for energy-intensive sectors where energy services are easily substituted for other factors of production (Section 3.1.3). The full scale of the emergent rebound effect is only visible at greater scope and complexity, and both computable general equilibrium (CGE) and integrative modeling approaches have been used to explore rebound at these macroeconomic scales. A number of CGE modeling studies are surveyed above (Section 3.1.4), which typically find macroeconomic rebounds across a relatively wide range of national economies to be on the order of 30-50% or greater, with a surprising number projecting backfire (rebound greater than 100%). While these CGE studies depict relatively simplified models of national economies and face numerous limitations, they do identify a number of factors that are likely to influence the scale of economy-wide rebound effects and are indicative of the much greater magnitude of rebound at this macroeconomic scope. Integrative modeling techniques offer a somewhat more complex portrayal of the economy, particularly of key sectors such as energy production. Although only a few such studies have examined rebound effects to date and generalized conclusions should thus be viewed with caution, these integrative modeling studies of national economies have found economy-wide rebound to be roughly 25-40% for the developed nations studied (Section 3.1.5). At the global scope most relevant to climate change and energy resource depletion concerns, the integrative modeling efforts of Barker, Foxon, and colleagues in the UK have yielded perhaps the most robust picture of global economy-wide rebound to date. This analysis projects that global efforts to capture ‘no-regrets,’ below-cost energy savings opportunities will trigger rebound effects that collectively erode more than half (52%) of projected energy savings potential by 2030 (see Section 3.1.5). The implications of these conclusions are hugely significant for energy and climate policymaking, and it is remarkable that rebound mechanisms remain almost entirely ignored in projections of energy efficiency’s ability to drive lasting reductions in energy use or greenhouse gas emissions. Yet even these sophisticated integrative modeling efforts are inherently restricted by the availability of empirical data and the challenge of developing detailed models capable of approximating the complexity of interconnected national or global economies. Even these robust modeling efforts are therefore likely to have underestimated the potential for economy-wide rebound, given that they are currently restricted by exogenous assumptions about the scale of direct rebound and other key factors and are limited to modeling ‘pure’ energy productivity improvements without considering the potential for multi-factor productivity improvements from energy-saving technologies to trigger even greater rebound or even backfire. In the end, rebound effects are ‘emergent phenomena’ resulting from the complex interaction of multifold economic actors and mechanisms. Reductive inquiries into individual rebound effects in particular contexts (e.g., direct rebound for end-use energy services in OECD nations) are thus incapable of telling us much about the full operation of rebound effects that are only emergent at macroeconomic scales. Additionally, it is easy for even the best CGE and integrative modeling efforts to exclude particular rebound mechanisms for lack of available data or due to an inability to accurately model these complex effects. The results of these inquiries should thus be viewed with an asterisk next to any quantification of the rebound effect; total, economy-wide rebound at a global scale will likely be somewhat larger than even the most sophisticated global integrated models are able to project.

#### Tech advances cannot solve – they don’t address the main cause of violence and environmental harms: over consumption; increases in tech only exacerbate the rich/poor gap risking conflict. Their no transition or population won’t embrace args are just justifications for unsustainable tech.

Fauset ‘8

Claire Fauset, researcher. “Techno-fixes: a critical guide to climate change technologies”. Corporate Watch Report. http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=3126

As the climate crisis looms, choices about solutions become ever more important. However, the debate on the future is surrounded by hype and vested interests. This briefing seeks to assess the large-scale technologies that corporations and government are putting forward as solutions to climate change. It explains why they are unlikely to prevent climate catastrophe, looks at where the decisions about our strategies for survival are being made, and goes in search of more realistic and socially just solutions. This report includes an overview of the issues surrounding each of the key technologies that are being held up as solutions to climate change, and provides a joined-up analysis and a framework for comparisons. Making the right decisions about technology is vital to avoiding devastating climate change. But many of the technologies being put forward as solutions to this crisis simply won’t work, will worsen the situation, cause significant environmental destruction or are not going to be available with a short enough timeframe to help us. Even combined, they would fail to address the whole problem - for example, there can be no big technofix for deforestation, which currently causes around a fifth of all greenhouse gas emissions. Technofixes are very appealing. They appeal to leaders who want huge projects to put their name to. They appeal to governments in short electoral cycles who don’t want to have to face hard choices of changing the direction of development from economic growth to social change. Technofixes appeal to corporations which expect to capture new markets with intellectual property rights and emissions trading. They appeal to advertising-led media obsessed with the next big thing, but too shallow to follow the science. They appeal to a rich-world population trained as consumers of hi-tech gadgets. They appeal to (carbon) accountants: technological emissions reductions are neatly quantifiable, if you write the sum properly. Technofixes appeal, in short, to the powerful, because they offer an op- portunity to maintain power and privilege. But why are they the wrong answers? Surely technology is important? The discourse of ‘magic bul- lets’ completely ignores the complexities of different situations and needs, and the widely distributed and poorly measured sources of climate change. In short, it isn’t addressing the problem. If we are to have socially just and sustainable solutions to climate change, then we have to all look very criti- cally at how our social and economic systems are failing. If the approach to this problem is primarily technological it has the potential to deepen inequalities between rich and poor as the rich are able to afford access to proprietary technology which enables them to maintain high standards of living while the poor suffer the worst effects of climate change on top of continuing social injustice. This is a recipe for conflict. Climate change is already happening. Already the air and oceans are warming, growing seasons are shifting, and ice and snow cover have decreased across the world. Extreme weather events such as floods, cyclones and droughts are increasing across the world.1 The World Health Organization estimates that 150,000 people died in 2000 due to the impacts of climate change.2 It’s going to get worse. Business as usual means that a temperature rise of around four degrees centigrade above 1990-2000 levels can be expected this century - possibly as much as six degrees..3 Many scientists consider that limiting temperature increases to a maximum of two degrees above pre-industrial levels is necessary if we are to avoid devastating climate change.4 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which represents the international scientific consensus on the issue, suggests that to have a reasonable chance of limiting warming to two degrees would require a peak in global greenhouse gas emissions by 2015 at the latest, with emissions falling by 50-80% below 2000 levels by 2050 and in particular will need industrialized countries to reduce their emissions by 25% to 40% before 2020, and by 80% to 95% before 2050.5 This represents a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions of about 5% per year, every year. *Who owns the technology?* Not just the hardware (power stations, pipelines) but the patents and other intellectual property. Some technologies in particular – second-generation agrofuels, hydrogen, nano-solar – are likely to be dominated by a few companies owning fundamental patents and charging royalties for their use. How will this affect deployment if these technologies can be made to work? With over four thousand patents on ‘clean technologies’ granted in 2006 in the USA alone,9 is it legitimate that possible solutions to climate change be held to ransom? *Who controls the technology?* This is a question of control, and of democracy. If supplies are short, who gets them – those in need, or those who can pay? Beyond this, who should decide what the solutions to climate change are and which technologies represent the best way forward? How can these decisions be made democratically with participation from the people who will be most af- fected? Governments make decisions on which technologies to support through public funding. But much more money comes from the private sector, which invests based on potential for profit, not social benefit. And even then, govern- ment money often follows the corporate lead – corporations are widely represented on the Research Councils and other bodies which make public funding decisions. *Who gains from the technology? Who loses?* Is the balance of winners and losers just or equitable? For example, agrofuels benefit the companies that grow and trade them. They may keep fuel prices down for vehicle owners, but push up food prices for everyone, and cause land conflicts between plantations and small farmers. New technologies can also improve social justice: for example deployment of small-scale hydroelectric systems can make reliable, cheap, controllable electricity supplies available to people in areas without a centralised grid. In most discourse on climate mitigation, economic efficiency is prized above social justice. But promoting new tech- nologies which do not help social justice will entrench and exacerbate existing problems, making them all the harder to deal with in the future. Preferring those new technologies which intrinsically promote equality, democratic control and accessibility has wider benefits than the simple reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In relation to climate change, emissions have largely been the fault of the over-consuming rich, while the impacts are being felt most strongly by people in poorer countries. Climate change itself is thus a social justice issue and it is dou- bly unjust to promote solutions which would worsen the position of those who are already suffering. Inter-generational justice must also be considered - does a technology impose costs on future generations without conferring any benefits? For example, nuclear waste must be stored indefinitely, long after power stations are closed down; captured and stored carbon dioxide would have to be monitored for centuries after cheap fossil-fuel reserves have been exhausted. *How sustainable is the technology?* Greenhouse gas emissions reductions alone are not sufficient evidence of a technology’s benefits. Does the technol- ogy deplete other resources, for example by consumption of rare minerals or through its impact on natural ecosys- tems and biodiversity? Does it have other pollution impacts, such as hazardous waste? Does it encourage or rely on other damaging activities? For example, carbon capture and storage relies on coal mining and encourages greater oil extraction when used for ‘enhanced oil recovery’. Can the technology continue to be used in the long term without increasing negative impacts? *What scale of operations can the technology reach?* If a technology is being presented as the answer to a problem, eg a new source of vehicle fuel, it needs to be avail- able at a sufficient scale. So, for example, waste cooking oil is a sustainable source of vehicle fuel, but only available in very small quantities. First-generation agrofuels, even if social justice and sustainability issues could be overcome, could never supply current world vehicle fuel use. Scalability does not rule out a technology as such, but it is a crucial means of detecting hype around wrong answers which are promoted to allow continuation of business as usual. *When will it be available*? Climate science shows that emissions need to start falling within the next few years, and fall massively in 20 to 30 years. Technologies that are unlikely to be available at an effective scale within that timeframe are not helpful – re- sources should be diverted from these to more immediately available systems – and to ones which can be proven to work. The focus of governments and corporations on emissions targets for 2050 can also be viewed as part of a distraction strategy. 2050 is conveniently distant – a target for 2050 allows time to continue business-as-usual in the short term in the expectation of future technological breakthroughs. Tough targets for 2050 are not tough at all. Where are the techno-fix plans for a peak in global emissions by 2015? Ignoring the scale and source of the problem Focusing on technological solutions ignores how the problem of climate change is caused, why it continues to worsen and how much needs to be done to stop it. Climate change is the result of over-consumption of fossil fuels and of forest and land resources; about one third of emissions currently come from deforestation and agriculture.10 This consumption continues to grow in line with economic growth. Technological improvements will not tackle overconsumption or growth in demand; this requires radical changes to economic systems. Without such changes, any technology-based emissions reductions will eventually be eaten up by continued rising demand for energy and consumer goods – efficiency gains will be converted into greater consumption not long-term reduced emissions. Technologies which encourage consumers to maintain high energy use and fossil fuel dependency, such as carbon capture and storage, fail to address unsustainable consumption levels which are the basis of rich country economies and the cause of both climate change and other critical sustainability crises such as declining soil fertility and fresh water supplies. Even the IPCC now suggests that 85% cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are needed by 2050,11 other sources suggest as much as 90% reductions for the UK by 2030.12 Technology simply cannot deliver these levels of reduction without accompanying changes to demand, which requires economic and social transformation. Techno-fixation has masked the incompatibility of solving climate change with unlimited economic growth. A rational approach to a certain problem and a set of uncertain solutions might be to say that consumption should be limited to sustainable levels from now, with the possibility of increasing in future when new technologies come on stream. In- stead the approach taken has been to continue consuming to the same destructive levels in the expectation that new technologies will come on stream. The persistent claim that a solution is just around the corner has allowed politicians and corporations to cling to the mantra that tackling climate change will not impact on economic growth. In 2005, in his address to the World Economic Forum, Tony Blair said: ‘If we put forward, as a solution to climate change, some- thing that would impact on economic growth, it matters not how justified it is, it will simply not be agreed to [emphasis added]’.13 While this view may be slowly changing, it has delayed real action for years. Climate change is not the only crisis currently facing the planet. Peak oil (the point at which demand for oil outstrips available supply) is likely to become a major issue within the coming decade; while competition for land and water, de- forestation and destruction of ecosystems, soil fertility depletion and collapse of fisheries are already posing increas- ing problems for food supply and survival in many parts of the world. That’s on top of the perpetual issues of equity and social justice. Technological solutions to climate change generally fail to address most of these issues, except where they may reduce oil use. Yet even without climate change, this systemic environmental and social crisis threatens society, and demands deeper solutions than new technology alone can provide. Scarcity of investment Governments spend a limited amount of money on mitigating climate change. Investment in energy R&D (research and development) increased massively in the 1970s as a result of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, but in the last 30 years R&D investment as a proportion of GDP has continually declined to the point where it is roughly comparable to pre-1973 levels.14 Where this investment goes is a major issue. While it makes sense to research many options for mitigating climate change, time and resources are limited. In this context, it is worth looking at the distinction between inventions, or technological breakthroughs, and engineer- ing improvements. Some proposed technologies rely on things which simply don’t exist yet; synthetic microbes which ‘eat’ carbon dioxide and excrete hydrocarbons; a safe and efficient system for distributing and using hydrogen vehicle fuel; nuclear fusion power. This is not in itself an argument against any investment in these technological possibilities, but it is an argu- ment against reliance on such future technological breakthroughs. Claims that something which doesn’t exist yet will solve a known problem, and that it should take most of the available resources, should be viewed simply as a stalling tactic on the part of vested interests. Other technologies exist, but are benefiting from ongoing improvement; the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of pho- tovoltaic solar panels; devices for exploiting wave and tidal power; energy-efficient electrical appliances. These areas can be relied on to improve, though the timescale may be unpredictable. This is where technology investment needs to focus. At present, it is the technologies that allow business-as-usual to continue that are receiving the lion’s share of invest- ment, regardless of either potential benefit or feasibility. Investment in agrofuels or CCS means less investment in wave power, in decentralised energy or in economic and social changes to limit the need for high energy consumption. The US government is investing $179m (£89m) in agrofuels in 2008.15 €10bn (£7.9bn) is being spent on an interna- tional experimental nuclear fusion reactor in France.16 Diverting this money away from more immediately practical solutions makes the target of peaking greenhouse gas emissions by 2015 less achievable. It both delays the transition to a low-carbon economy and endangers the future by making devastating climate change more likely. Transition – the period of change between the high-emitting societies of today and a distant sustainable future, is a hot topic. But while this change must come, the ‘transition’ discourse coming from governments and corporations is frequently a cover for arguments that would permit use of technologies in the short term which are known to be unjustifi- able in the long term – geoengineering, first generation agrofuels, ‘carbon-capture ready’ coal fired power stations are argued to be necessary now. But why? Largely to prevent serious change to the rich world’s over-consuming lifestyles. The discourse of transition delays the inevitable. When is the real transition to a low-emission, more equitable society even going to start? How long is it going to last? Technological change is part of the solution. But only part. It is useful only as long as it is compatible with, and prefer- ably supports, other changes to the way society works. Even though these changes are not the focus of this report, a brief summary follows. Economic change Current government approaches to climate change consist largely of tinkering with policy and expecting the market to deliver emissions reductions. But the market doesn’t want to deliver emissions reductions, it wants to deliver profits. Carbon prices are an arbitrary figure unrelated to the real social and environmental cost of emissions. Meanwhile, poli- cies which may ‘harm’ the economy have been shied away from. This green capitalist approach is asking the wrong question. Instead of asking how to continue to grow the economy while living on the limited resources left on this planet, it should be asking – why is economic growth seen as more important than survival? What is growth and do we need it? The current global economic system is based on the assumption of indefinite growth. While ongoing growth in some areas is possible without more consumption of natural resources and emissions of greenhouse gases, this covers only relatively small sectors of the economy – some services and purely information-based products. Growth of the whole global economy means consumption of an ever-increasing amount of goods, using an ever-increasing quantity of en- ergy, mineral, agricultural and forest resources. Even if energy intensity per unit of economic activity can be reduced, ongoing growth eats up the improvement and overall energy consumption still rises. Renewable energy alone cannot decouple consumption from climate change.

#### Development discourses motivate external intervention into the “Third World”, risking nuclear escalation and endless wars

Arturo **Escobar** – Anthropology, UC Santa Cruz - **95**

Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of The Third World, p.34

The cold war was undoubtedly one of the single most important factors at play in the conformation of the strategy of development. The historical roots of development and those of East-West politics lie in one and the same process: the political rearrangements that occurred after World War II. In the late 1940s, the real struggle between East and West had already moved to the Third World, and development became the grand strategy for advancing such rivalry and, at the same time, the designs of industrial civilization. The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet: Union thus lent legitimacy to the enterprise of modernization and development; to extend the sphere of political and cultural influence became an end in itself. The relationship between military concerns and the origins of development has scarcely been studied. Pacts of military assistance, for example, were signed at the Rio conference of 1947 between the United States and all Latin American countries (Varas 1985). In time, they would give way to doctrines of national security intimately linked to development strategies. It is no coincidence that the vast majority of the approximately 150 wars of the last four decades were fought in the Third World, many of them with the direct or indirect participation of powers external to the Third World (Soedjatmoko 1985). The Third World, far from being peripheral, was central to superpower rivalry and the possibility of nuclear confrontation. The system that generates conflict and instability and the system that generates underdevelopment are inextricably bound. Although the end of the cold war and the rise of the New World Order have changed the configuration of power, the Third World is still the most important arena of confrontation (as the Gulf War, the bombing of Libya, and the invasions of Grenada and Panama indicate). AIthough increasingly differentiated, the South is still, perhaps more clearly than ever, the opposite camp to a growingly unified North, despite the latter's localized ethnic wars.

#### North-South disparity causes global nuclear wars

Goldstein ‘10

Joshua S. Goldstein, Professor Emeritus, School of International Service, American University. 2010. “Changing World Order - Engaging the South”. http://wps.ablongman.com/long\_goldstein\_ir\_7/35/8977/2298242.cw/index.html

In the last chapter’s “Changing World Order” section, there was mention of how a smallpox epidemic launched from the global South and aimed at the global North would most likely return to do most damage in the South. This quality of global rebound operates from North to South as well. Actions the North takes in the South, such as arming Islamic extremists to fight Soviet occupiers in Afghanistan in the 1980s, come back to haunt the North later—as when Afghan-based Islamic extremists attacked the United States. The problem of unintended consequences of distant actions has been called “blowback.”\* September 2001 demonstrated the increased interdependence of the global North and South. The extreme disparities of wealth and power between North and South create conflicts and resentments that can reach out of the South to punish the privileged citizens of the North who had been oblivious to the problems of poor countries. In the world order of the 1990s, disparities sharpened and prosperity cut unevenly with both winners and losers. The continent of Africa, along with zones of festering war and poverty in countries like Afghanistan, were losers in the 1990s. To let a continent or even a country descend into despair may no longer be practical in the era of terrorism. Their fate ultimately may be the fate of the North that ignores them. This is the century in which desperate African states will be able to press their demands with weapons of mass destruction, and in which fanatics may destroy cities with nuclear weapons. To combat terrorism may—though this is disputed—require addressing poverty, repression, and war throughout the poorest world regions. Furthermore, these issues may be less amenable to unilateral U.S. actions than are military responses to terrorism. Thus, the need to address “root causes” of terrorism may draw the United States into closer cooperation with the UN and other international institutions in the years to come. It is unclear how these relationships will play out in practice. But if in fact the new world order is moving toward closer engagement of the global North with the South, and toward seriously addressing the South’s problems, this move would mark a shift from the world order that was developing in the 1990s, with its sharpened disparities. Do you think that investing in development, democracy, and peace in the world’s poorest countries is an important principle that should govern world order in the era of terrorist attacks? If you think this is a good idea, should it extend globally or just to countries currently “breeding” terrorists? Can Argentina or Democratic Congo fall apart without upsetting the rest of the world? Could all of Latin America or all of Africa? Will the emerging world order bring together the North and South in new ways?

#### Turns warming - Whole world development is ecologically impossible, undesirable, and ultimately ends in an apocalypse. Attempts to prevent emissions in our own world only ensure worse technology in the global south.

Bob Sutcliffe– Economics, University of the Basque Country–1999

 “The Place of Development in Theories of Imperialism and Globalization.” Critical Development Theory. Eds. Ronaldo Munck, and Denis O'Hearn London: Zed Books Ltd, p.137-138.

The attainability critique of development argues that it is physically impossible for the whole world to reach the received destination. The stronger versions claim, though the claim hardly yet amounts to proof, that the per head levels of emission of greenhouse gases, and other contaminants and of use of nonrenewable resources typical of industrialized countries cannot be generalized to the population of the world as a whole without causing an apocalypse. 'Actually existing development' is seen less as the accumulation of goods and economic welfare and more as the accumulation of burdens on the environment. The voracious pig that is happier the more it eats is replaced by the finely balanced camel whose back breaks if it is over laden. Universal development is therefore an unsustainable illusion: the received destination of development has been part of a Faustian pact with the devil, allowing some to enjoy a brief material orgy destined to end in disaster. This fundamental critique of the assumptions of the standard model redefines development as a state that cannot be ecologically sustained in the long term. But ecologically centered writing produces various conclusions about what happens along the route. These range from a ` light' version which sees a more advanced, cleaner technology as a saviour; through neo-Malthusian population reduction; to a more thorough-going anti-materialism and anti-consumerism, often combined with proposals for a `return' to a society based on small, mostly self sufficient communities. The ecological critique, therefore, can be a critique either of the route, or of the attainability of the destination, or of both. There is still, however, little agreement about the exact physical dimensions of this problem and even less about a possible way around it. The attainability critique also tends to displace the nation as the focus of development since the problems to which it draws attention are apt to be relevant to a space at once more local and more global (Sutcliffe 1995).Even if the received destination were attainable, a growing number of critics have been saying that it is undesirable. After what economists call `the golden age' (1950-73), when rates of economic growth were the fastest ever experienced, it was still apparent that not only people in poor countries but also many groups in rich countries did not regard their existential needs as having been met. Implicitly and explicitly the desirability of development was increasingly questioned. This is, I think, the significance of the `new social movements' to the development debate. The demands of each of them (women, ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, senior citizens, and so on) constitute, at least implicitly, a critique of the standard development destination, a denial that the supposed social benefits of development flow more or less automatically from high levels of productivity and material consumption. Because they come from so many quarters, the desirability critiques are even more diverse than the attainability critique. But they are no less fundamental. The concept of desirability, like attainability, tends to displace the nation from the centre of the development goal. It emphasizes how even rich, productive, `developed' nations can be full of needy, oppressed and unfulfilled people.

- when small scale violence happens people come to accept violence - it primes them to accept it psychologically, that drives demand for macro-level conflicts

#### Structural violence is the proximate cause of all war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

\*\*Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the *scale* of violence and the *disproportionate* *relationship* between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).